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Introduction 
Since 1993, the Swiss federal agricultural policy has been providing financial support for 
organic farming via area payments. Like other voluntary agri-environmental measures 
(AEM), these payments are intended as incentives for farmers to comply with defined 
production standards. Such payments lead to better environmental performance, as 
compliance with organic production standards averts negative and provides positive 
external effects compared to conventional or integrated farming (CRER, 2002). For 
instance, organic farming is largely not dependent on external inputs. This minimises the 
resource use of the farming system and limits the nutrient loads in the system, which in 
turn leads to less overfertilisation and reduced eutrophication risks involving nitrogen and 
phosphorus (Haas et al., 2001). Besides effectiveness, against the background of limited 
public budgets, efficiency in delivering environmental impacts plays a fundamental role 
in the further development of direct payment schemes (Swiss Federal Council, 2009). 
The targeting and tailoring of policies to achieve maximum effectiveness with a given 
budget is essential (OECD, 2007). It is therefore necessary to compare both 
environmental effects and the societal costs of AEM with each other in order to provide a 
basis for economically sound policy design (Pearce, 2005). 
Agricultural economists hold differing views on the cost-effectiveness of organic farming 
support payments. Von Alvensleben (1998) argues that the organic farming area support 
payments are not economically sound, as the policy goals could be achieved more 
efficiently using more flexible and targeted combinations of various AEM. The economic 
rationale behind this argument was introduced by Tinbergen (1956), who theorised that 
an efficient policy requires at least as many specific instruments as there are specific 
goals. However, the Tinbergen Rule may not apply fully in this case due to interactions 
between policies, conflicting goals and the limited determinability of different aspects of 
environmental performance. Furthermore, the multi-purpose character of organic 
agriculture could increase its cost-effectiveness due to its potentially lower transaction 
costs compared to targeted AEM (Dabbert et al., 2004). 
Empirical papers on this question lack. Thus, this paper  aims  to  compare  the cost-
effectiveness of a)  direct payments to organic farms  and  b) AEM, in providing 
environmental services. This is done, using the current Swiss agricultural policy scheme 
as a case study. 
Methods 
In this section, first the general understanding of cost-effectiveness is reviewed. Second, 
a brief overview of the Swiss FARMIS model is given. Third, the extensions made to 
FARMIS for evaluating organic farming and AEM are explained. Finally, the way of 
comparing organic farming as a system approach with specific AEM is described. 
Cost-effectiveness of direct payments 
The cost-effectiveness ratio (CE) of a policy is the relation between effectiveness, 
expressed in physical terms and costs, expressed in monetary terms  (Pearce, 2005). 
Equation 1 is the basis for deriving cost-effectiveness algebraically for several policies (i) 
and environmental effects (j). 
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where CEij is the cost-effectiveness of policy i in relation to environmental effect j. CE is 
defined as a ratio of the environmental effect (Ej) of policy i and the cost (C) of policy i.  
The total sector-level environmental effect can be calculated, as in Equation 2, by adding 
up the effects multiplied by the areas where the effects occur. 
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Eij  is the total environmental effect of policy  i on environmental category j. AR 
characterises policy uptake (e.g. measured in hectares) x is the index for uptake. 
Alike the cumulative environmental effects, the total additional policy-related cost at 
sector level can be calculated using Equation 3  
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where PLix is the payment level for policy i and area x; TCFARM are the farm-level policy-
related transaction costs (PRTC), TCVAR  the variable share of the public PRTC, and 
TCFIX the fixed public PRTC. 
The reciprocal of CER  is called abatement cost (ABC) in the case of negative 
externalities and provision cost (PRC) in the case of positive external effects (Equation 
4).  
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where RE is the relative effect (expressed as a percentage) on the environmental category 
resulting from the policy. Wj is the weight of the each category. W can be determined 
according to societal preferences, or normative approaches (e.g. distance to target).  
J is the number of environmental categories taken into account. Policies with a high CE 
will be more favourable compared to policies with a low CE for the given set of 
environmental categories.  
Thus, cost-effectiveness of AEM can be understood as a function of a) payment levels, b) 
policy uptake, c) environmental effectiveness and d) public expenditure. 
The CH-FARMIS model 
The Swiss FARMIS Model (CH-FARMIS) is a comparative-static mathematical 
programming model for the Swiss agricultural sector based on positive mathematical 
programming (PMP) (Howitt, 1995). As an optimisation model, FARMIS attempts to 
model directly the decision-making process of farmers using an objective function which 
explicitly takes expectations and the technical production environment into account 
(Bertelsmeier, 2005). Farmers’ responses to changes in exogenous conditions (e.g. direct 
payments or product prices) are thus modelled by conducting ‘synthetic experiments’ 
(Berger, 2000). In contrast to econometric approaches, FARMIS models the decision-
making process directly  using an objective function for each farm group subject to 
production constraints. 46 plant production activities and 27 animal production activities 
are considered in CH-FARMIS. Each activity receives farm group-specific input-output 
factors which determine their relative economic preferability. 
Data used in the FARMIS model included: bookkeeping records (Swiss FADN) of the 
years 2006 and 2007 (this dataset comprised 3500 farms selected to be representative of 
the Swiss farming community); the Swiss farm structure survey and normative data about 
production technologies and prices; and data on non-renewable energy use, biodiversity 4 
 
and N-  and P-eutrophication from the Swiss Agriculture Life Cycle Assessments 
(SALCA) (Nemecek et al., 2005). 
The standard FARMIS modelling procedure consists of four steps: First, the farm groups 
are assembled on the basis of FADN data. For this study farms were grouped according 
to region (lowlands, hills, mountains), farm type (dairy farms, suckler cow farms, mixed 
farms) and farming system (organic, conventional). Due to a lack of organic farms in the 
FADN, a further stratification was not possible. Second, input-output data are generated 
specifically for the assigned farm groups.  Third, the detailed model assumptions are 
specified according to the requirements of the research question. Fourth, the model is 
calibrated for the base year by running it as a linear programme with calibration 
constraints in order to reveal the hidden, i.e. not explicitly modelled, costs. Fifth, policy 
scenarios are calculated using the calibrated, quadratic PMP model and scenario-specific 
assumptions. A detailed description of the Swiss FARMIS is given by Sanders (2007) 
and Schader (2009). 
Modelling uptake of AEM within FARMIS 
The uptake of agri-environmental policies needs to be modelled differently from ordinary 
activities, since farmers’ decisions follow a different rationale than when switching 
between standard activities. The Röhm-Dabbert approach (RDA) (Röhm and Dabbert, 
2003) presents a more realistic model of behaviour by defining intensity levels, according 
to the uptake or non-uptake of an agri-environmental policy. These intensity levels are 
treated by the model as ‘similar activities’, i.e.  activities which entail similar 
requirements in terms of machinery and labour input. Without the definition of similar 
activities, all activities are exchanged according to the  standard  PMP coefficients. 
However, in reality farmers are able to switch easily between different intensity levels 
without replacing all their machinery or other farm processes. In contrast, switching 
from, say, wheat production to grassland requires many changes on the farm, considered 
in the model as a farm’s hidden costs. Since these hidden costs differ depending on 
whether farms switch from one intensity level to the other or whether they switch 
between activities, different PMP cost terms need to be included in the objective 
functions.  
The income (Z) of each farm group is maximised allowing for revenues from agricultural 
production, direct payments, fixed and variable cost components. The first term of the 
objective function (Equation 9) sums up the revenues for marketed products. The second 
term adds up all direct cost components per activity. This encompasses various types of 
expenditure on seeds, crop protection, purchased fodder, veterinary services, animal 
medicines, primary energy, insurances, and contract work. The third term covers 
revenues from direct payments, while PXni specifies the grade of eligibility of the farm 
for a certain activity. The fourth, fifth and sixth term comprise costs for employed labour 
force, purchased fertilisers and rented land. 
There are two types of quadratic hidden cost parameters (ω) in the extended objective 
function. This implies that hidden costs are split into a) a share which depends on the 
level of the intensity (with ωn1 as slope coefficient), and b) a share which depends on the 
level of the other intensities of a particular activity (with ωn2 as slope coefficient), while δ 
ensures the exact calibration of the intensity levels according to the empirically observed 
levels in the base year (Kuepker, 2004; Röhm and Dabbert, 2003). 5 
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Ynjk, Xni, PXni, Unu, Vnv, LANDnl ≥ 0 
where: 
Indices: 
n   = index for farm groups 
i   = index for production 
activities 
j   = index for output 
products 
k  = index for intensity 
levels 
w  = index for intensity 
levels ≠ w 
l   = index for land type 
u   = index for labour 
v   = index for fertilisers 
Variables: 
Z   = objective (profit per 
farm group) 
Y   = sales of agricultural 
products 
X   = level of activities 
PX   = level of activities 
eligible for direct 
payments 
U   = level of labour 
input/requirements 
V  = level of fertiliser 
input/requirement 
LAND = level of rented UAA 
Parameters: 
p  = prices for agricultural 
products 
c   = activity-specific costs  
dp  = activity-specific direct 
payments 
r  = variable costs 
δ   = parameter for linear 
hidden cost  
ω   = parameters for 
quadratic hidden cost 
(depending on the 
alternative intensity 
levels) 
δ, ωn1 and ωn2 are derived according to (Kuepker, 2004). Accordingly, uptake of agri-
environmental policies is modelled by defining separate sub-activities reflecting the 
uptake choices of farmers. Two types of grassland extensification payments,  a) 
‘payments for less intensive meadows’ and b) ‘payments for extensive meadows’ were 
modelled using the RDA. Furthermore, as an agri-environmental policy for grains and 
rapeseed, ‘extenso payments’ are implemented for conventional farms
1.  
By contrast, organic farming area support payments (OFASP) cannot be modelled using 
the RDA (Schmid and Sinabell, 2006), as these specific policy instrument is not the 
dominant factor influencing farmers decision for conversion. Economically, conversion 
depends much more than for AEM on market price expectations and soft factors which 
have not been identified to a sufficient extent to be modelled at sector level (Bichler et 
al., 2005; Hollenberg, 2001). 
Modelling environmental effects within CH-FARMIS 
Due to the complexity and the multitude of environmental impacts associated with 
organic agriculture, not all relevant impacts could be considered. The subsequent 
quantitative modelling analysis focuses on three key environmental categories (non-
renewable energy use, biodiversity (expressed as habitat quality), eutrophication with N 
and P). This selection was based on the following criteria: a) the importance of the 
environmental category in the current policy debate, b) the importance of agriculture for 
the environmental category, c) the existence of systematic differences between organic 
and non-organic farming systems, d) the feasibility of modelling the environmental 
indicators at sector level and e) the availability of comprehensive, quantitative and widely 
accepted data for Switzerland. 
Data for all environmental impacts was taken from Swiss Agriculture Life Cycle 
Assessment data (Nemecek et al., 2005). All environmental indicators were related to 
                                                 
1 Organic farms are eligible for these payments by definition as the restrictions are covered in any case by 
the organic farming standards. Organic farms therefore have a fixed uptake level of 100 % for extenso 
payments. 6 
 
area (e.g. energy use per ha and year) as the object of evaluation were direct payments 
which were paid also on a hectare basis. Furthermore, it is currently methodologically not 
possible to relate biodiversity impacts to product level. According to the standard system 
boundaries for life cycle assessments, the calculations for energy use and eutrophication 
included impacts from inputs (e.g. purchased mineral fertilisers, pesticides and fodder). 
Data were linked to FARMIS predominantly via activities. Energy use for milking and 
purchased fodder was linked to calculated inputs and outputs quantities. 
Modelling public expenditure within CH-FARMIS 
Costs of agri-environmental policies are modelled from a budgetary perspective as in 
Marggraf (2003). Total public expenditure (PETOTAL) on direct payments is calculated by 
adding up the payments to the beneficiaries (PC) (Equation 13). Furthermore, variable as 
well as fixed transaction costs at cantonal and national level  are added (TCVAR  and 
TCFIX), while farm-level transaction costs are not considered, as they are meant to be 
compensated already by the direct payments. Data was derived from empirical data by 
Buchli and Flury (2005) and Mann (2003). 
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where: 
n   = index for farm group 
i   = index for production activities 
k   = index for intensity level 
PETOTAL  = total public expenditure on a policy 
PC   = costs for payments to beneficiaries (farmers) 
TCVAR  = variable public policy-related transaction costs 
TCFIX   = fixed public policy-related transaction costs 
 
Derivation of cost-effectiveness of organic farming support and AEM 
As conversion to and from organic agriculture (as the equivalent to “policy uptake” 
regarding AEM) could not modelled explicitly in FARMIS, two different approaches had 
to be taken to derive RE and C for a) organic  farming support  was evaluated by 
comparing farm organic and conventional farm groups in the base year and b) AEMs 
were modelled by running policy scenarios in which payment levels for each AEM were 
set to 0. 
The  cost-effectiveness of organic farming support  was evaluated from an ex-post 
perspective for organic farming as a system approach, rather than taking into account 
only the OFASP,  which is responsible for only a small part of the difference in 
environmental performance and public expenditure.  
In order to derive a value for cost-effectiveness (CE), the relative environmental effects 
(RE) and the absolute difference in average public expenditure (C) have to be 
determined. Both parameters are obtained by comparing organic with conventional farm 
groups in the base year, i.e. from an ex-post perspective. Either all farms of both farming 
systems are compared, or specific farm types or regions, in order to diminish structural 
differences between organic farm groups (regional or farm types) and their conventional 
counterparts.  
The RE are expressed as hectare averages in relative terms (%) in order to avoid 
upscaling problems when aggregating different farm groups, and to assure consistency 7 
 
between the environmental indicators. RE is calculated as in Equation 14, where IND is 
the average state of the respective environmental impact indicator per ha in the farming 
system. 
CON
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C is also expressed as a hectare average. The parameter was derived by subtracting the 
total public expenditure per ha on conventional farms (PECON) from the total public 
expenditure per ha on organic farms (PEORG) (Equation 15). PECON  and PEORG  are 
obtained equivalently to PETOTAL (Equation 13) with index ‘n’ being limited to organic or 
conventional farms respectively. 
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The cost-effectiveness of AEM is derived by comparing the cost-effectiveness of all 
farms in the policy scenarios with all farms in the base year (calculations for specific 
farm types and regions have been made but are not presented in this paper for the benefit 
of brevity). In the policy scenarios, the payments for policy measures are set to 0 CHF/ha. 
Thus, a hypothetical situation is modelled, in  which the payments which are under 
evaluation are abolished. In other words, empirical data on the ‘treatment’ and modelled 
data on the ‘counterfactuals’ (base year) were obtained. 
Accordingly, the difference between the reference scenario and each policy  scenario 
without the payment is interpreted as the additionality of the respective policy measure, 
as the model shows how farmers would respond, if the payment was not disbursed. The 
additionality consists of both a direct and an indirect component. The direct component 
relates directly to the policy uptake induced by the payment, while the indirect 
component refers to other responses from the farm groups, such as changes in stocking 
density or uptake of other AEM. This is presented in Equations 16 and 17. 
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where INDBASE and INDSCEN refer to the state of the environmental indicators in the base 
year and scenario, respectively. The same distinction is made for public expenditure (PE) 
and utilised agricultural area (UAA).  
Results 
Cost-effectiveness of organic farming support 
Across all farms, the additional public expenditure for organic farms per ha amounts to 
686 CHF (Table 1). This figure varies regionally from 305.8 CHF/ha in mountain areas, 
489 CHF/ha in hill areas to 537.7 CHF in the lowlands. Average per-ha costs in terms of 
additional public expenditure for organic farm types range from 310.5 CHF to 737.7 CHF 
for mixed farms, while organic dairy farms entail an additional 447.2 CHF per ha among 
different farm types. 8 
 
Table 1  Abatement and provision costs of organic farming by region and farm type, 
expressed as CHF/ha for a 1% improvement of the indicator (2006/07) 
 
The relative differences in environmental effects between organic and conventional farms 
vary by farm type and region. Energy use per ha is between 30-55% lower on organic 
farms than on their conventional counterparts. This is mainly due to the lower stocking 
rates, less purchase of concentrate feed and the ban of mineral fertilisers. The main factor 
for the better habitat quality on organic farms (by 23-86%) lies in the higher uptake rate 
of AEM, mainly extensive meadows on organic farms. Eutrophication potential per ha on 
organic farms is lower by 11-32% due to less fertiliser input. 
The figures for total farms are often higher than for specific farm groups, because 
structural differences between farms are influencing the results. For instance, there is 
higher share of organic farms in mountain regions from total organic farms than 
conventional farms in mountain regions from total conventional farms. As per-ha energy 
use tends to be lower in mountain regions, this leads to higher relative differences 
between the farming systems. 
Abatement/provision  costs express the costs that were spent on achieving a 1 % 
improvement in the respective environmental indicator.  With regard to regions, 
abatement costs for total energy use per ha are 9.2 CHF/ha, 9.7 CHF/ha and 12 CHF/ha 
for mountains, lowlands, and hills respectively. Regarding farm types, abatement costs 
range from 8.6 CHF/ha on suckler cow farms to 15.1 CHF/ha on mixed farms, while 
costs on dairy cow farms are 14.7 CHF/ha. 
Provision costs for habitat quality vary markedly among the regions. In particular, low 
provision costs were calculated for mountain regions (5.9 CHF/ha) and hill regions 
(8.1 CHF/ha), while in the lowlands provision costs of 18.5 CHF/ha were incurred. Farm-
type differences were even higher than regional differences, with 5.6 CHF/ha for 
mountain regions, 8.1 CHF/ha for hills and 18.5 CHF/ha in the lowlands. 
Abatement costs for eutrophication range from 13.92 CHF/ha in the mountain areas to 
22.2 CHF/ha in the hill areas and 50.1 CHF/ha in the lowlands. Mixed farms have the 
highest eutrophication abatement costs at 55.2 CHF/ha. Abatement costs on dairy farms 
amount to 17.6 CHF/ha followed by 9.6 CHF/ha on suckler cow farms. 
Cost-effectiveness of AEM 
Table 2  presents the cost-effectiveness of the measures expressed as abatement and 
provision costs, which is the reciprocal value of the cost-effectiveness ratio. It shows that 
Unit Lowlands Hill Mountain
Dairy
farms
Suckler cow 
farms
Mixed farms
Total 
farms
Cost Public expenditure CHF/ha 537.71           489.00           305.80           447.16           310.54           737.65           685.99          
Energy use %* 55.25             40.85             33.21             30.44             35.99             48.92             54.39            
Habitat quality %* 23.18             29.06             60.52             52.70             85.69             34.11             55.03            
Total eutrophication %* 10.73             22.07             21.99             25.37             32.34             13.36             35.26            
N-eutrophication %* 9.36              22.60             23.41             26.58             34.65             12.39             37.49            
P-eutrophication %* 32.71             17.49             15.00             16.86             13.53             27.44             11.22            
Total energy use CHF/1%** 9.73              11.97             9.21              14.69             8.63              15.08             12.61            
Habitat quality CHF/1%** 23.20             16.83             5.05              8.49              3.62              21.63             12.47            
Total eutrophication CHF/1%** 50.13             22.16             13.91             17.63             9.60              55.22             19.45            
N-eutrophication CHF/1%** 57.43             21.64             13.06             16.82             8.96              59.56             18.30            
P-eutrophication CHF/1%** 16.44             27.96             20.38             26.53             22.96             26.89             61.12            
*relative difference between organic and conventional farms with conventional farms = 100 %; 
**CHF/ha*1%improvement of the indicator Source: own calculations based on Swiss FADN and SALCA data
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achieving relative improvements is most expensive with extenso payments. The indicator 
shows that habitat-quality improvements are particularly costly. By contrast, extensive 
meadows achieve very low values for abatement costs of 9.3 CHF/% for energy use and 
0.7 CHF/% for habitat quality. Abatement costs for eutrophication, on the other hand, are 
relatively high at 6.4 CHF/%. 
Table 2  Abatement and provision costs of agri-environmental policy measures 
regarding the analysed environmental indicators 
The combination of AEM entails higher abatement costs, as the environmental effects are 
only slightly higher and the costs substantially exceed those of the payments for 
extensive meadows.  
By correspondence to the higher cost-effectiveness of combined payments on organic 
farms, the abatement costs are substantially lower as compared to conventional farms. 
With combined payments energy use could be reduced at 6.1 CHF/% as compared to 
56.9 CHF/%. Provision costs for habitat quality are only 1.3 CHF/% on organic farms 
compared to 4.3 CHF/% on conventional farms. With regard to eutrophication, the 
abatement costs are 7.2 CHF/% compared to 37.4 CHF/% on conventional farms. 
Cost-effectiveness of less intensive meadows was not defined, because in fact this AEM 
results in negative environmental effects and savings in public expenditure. This result 
seems irritating at first glance but is due to the cross-compliance regulation in 
Switzerland. Farms need to have 7% of their UAA under agri-environmental schemes 
and therefore less intensive meadows are an efficient way for farms to comply. If the 
payments would not be given, farms would tend to implement extensive meadows more 
frequently, which results in an improvement of environmental indicators and additional 
public expenditure. Uptake of extenso payments, proved to be inelastic. Even if this 
policy measure was abolished the model predicts only a slight intensification of grain and 
rape production. This inelastic response is due to the higher prices for extensively 
produced grains which is responsible for an often better economic performance than 
intensive production. This implies that there are high windfall profits entailed with 
extensor payments. 
Comparison of organic farming with AEM 
The average cost-effectiveness and average abatement costs of the three indicators was 
calculated as a non-weighted mean according to Equations 6-8 with Wj = 1/J. The highest 
average improvement has been found for the combined AEM and extensive meadows 
(7.2 %) (Table 3). The relative environmental effect of organic farming is only slightly 
 Extenso 
 Less
 intensive 
meadows 
 Exten-
sive  
meadows 
 Com-
bined 
AEM 
 Extenso 
 Less
 intensive 
meadows 
 Exten-
sive  
meadows 
 Com-
bined 
AEM 
 Extenso 
 Less
 intensive 
meadows 
 Exten-
sive  
meadows 
 Com-
bined 
AEM 
Fossil energy use CHF/% 386.3        n.d. 11.8          56.9          631.3        39.8          n.d. 6.1            383.3        n.d. 9.3            48.9         
Habitat quality CHF/% 543.0        n.d. 0.8            4.3            859.0        -7.5           n.d. 1.3            573.1        n.d. 0.7            4.1           
Total eutrophication CHF/% 130.5        n.d. 8.2            37.4          -282.5       8.7            n.d. 7.2            137.4        n.d. 6.6            33.6         
N-eutrophication CHF/% 123.1        n.d. 7.9            36.0          -250.4       7.3            n.d. 6.5            129.3        n.d. 6.4            32.2         
P-eutrophication CHF/% 373.2        n.d. 11.6          62.8          -10'410.5   -21.2         n.d. 28.1          395.1        n.d. 9.9            60.3         
Source: own calculations based on Swiss FADN and SALCA data
Indicator Unit
Conventional farms Organic farms All farms
n.d.: cost-effectiveness of this policy is not defined, as the payment induces negative cost10 
 
lower at 4.7 %. Average environmental effects of both extenso payments and less 
intensive meadows are insignificant. 
Abatement costs are, lowest for extensive meadows at 1.8 CHF/%. The combination of 
AEM costs 10.1 CHF/ha per % of environmental improvement, while organic farming 
costs 14.2 CHF/%. Abatement costs of extenso payments are highest, at 257.9 CHF/%, 
while the abatement costs for less intensive meadows are not defined. The combination of 
AEM costs only 2.79 CHF/% when implemented on a hectare on an organic farm, 
compared to 10.94 CHF/% on conventional farm. The main driver for this difference in 
abatement cost is that organic farms tend to take up the highly effective extensive 
meadows to a much higher degree than conventional farms.  
Table 3  Average cost-effectiveness of organic farming compared to AEM 
 
Sensitivity analyses were conducted regarding payment levels, policy uptake elasticity, 
number of policy targets and the weighting of targets against each other. In general the 
sensitivity analyses revealed that the main result of a comparable cost-effectiveness of 
organic farming support compared to the combination of individual payments is robust. 
Only variations in uptake elasticity revealed a significant influence on the ranking of the 
policy measures. If a more elastic uptake response was assumed, the model calculated a 
higher cost-effectiveness for the measures, while the assumption of more inelastic uptake 
led to lower cost-effectiveness. If the Röhm-Dabbert approach was not applied, i.e. 
assuming a standard elasticity of the policy measures, the combination of AEM would 
entail slightly higher abatement costs (15.5 CHF) than for organic farming. 
Discussion 
The present study showed  that organic farming in Switzerland is able to deliver 
environmental services at a competitive cost compared to a combination of currently 
implemented agri-environmental policies. However,  this study cannot deliver 
generalisable results on the cost-effectiveness of organic farming with respect to 
environmental impacts, not least because environmental effectiveness and costs depend, 
of course, on specific geographic and political contexts.  
Methodologically, this study revealed that particularly the question of modelling uptake 
of AEM and conversion of organic farming need to be addressed. Econometric estimation 
of the PMP coefficients, as discussed by Heckelei (2002), could be a promising way to 
go. Furthermore, other policy options than existing AEM have to be explored. Due to the 
limitations of the PMP approach, different types of deriving cost-effectiveness had to be 
applied. This limits the comparability of the figures derived for cost-effectiveness but on 
the other hand allows us to take into account structural differences between organic farms 
and conventional farms.  
Furthermore, the question regarding the means by which this support should be granted is 
a different one. Different combinations of measures could be more cost-effective than the 
Indicator Unit
Organic 
agriculture
Extenso
Less 
intensive 
meadows
Extensive 
meadows
Combined 
AEM
Combined 
AEM on 
organic 
farms
combined 
AEM on 
conventional 
farms
Public expenditure CHF / ha 66.58              28.24              -0.49              12.76              73.17              23.11              78.62             
Average improvement % 4.68               0.11               -0.78              7.22               7.24               8.29               7.19              
Average abatement cost CHF / %* 14.22              257.89            n.d. 1.77               10.10              2.79               10.94             
Source: own calculations based on Swiss FADN and SALCA data * Costs per ha for improving the environmental indicators on average by 1%11 
 
current system of OFASP. In addressing this question, however, the support for organic 
farming becomes a policy goal in itself. According to Elliott et al. (2003), the main 
rationale for such a policy is the provision of environmental public goods and 
compensation for market failure. International evaluation studies of organic farming 
schemes  (CRER, 2002)  and organic action plans in Europe (Lampkin  et al., 2008) 
suggest a wide portfolio of measures, which could develop mutually synergetic effects 
with current support schemes both in Switzerland and elsewhere.  
Conclusions 
Direct payments to organic farms proved to be a competitive instrument complementary 
to single agri-environmental policies, showing a stable effectiveness across all regions 
and farm types and an even effect across all analysed impact categories in the specific 
case analysed in this study. Furthermore, mutually enhancing interactions with the policy 
measure ‘payments for extensive meadows’ were found. 
However, this study cannot provide the basis for advice regarding the choice of policy 
instruments for supporting organic farming, since OFASP  were not specifically 
evaluated: Instead, the total surplus direct payments to organic farms compared to 
conventional farms were considered. Other policy measures, e.g. conversion payments, 
investment support, compensation for inspection costs, input taxes on mineral fertilisers 
or pesticides, or tax exemptions for organic farms could be alternative, better-performing 
options. Furthermore, the results of this paper suggest a regional or farm type-specific 
differentiation of payment levels, since both the costs and environmental effects of 
organic farming differed between the groups analysed. The approach developed could be 
used to analyse the potential for such a differentiation.  
Acknowledgements 
Many thanks especially to Thomas Nemecek and Gerard Gaillard for providing life cycle 
assessment data and to Jürn Sanders, Frank Offermann and Bernhard Osterburg for 
supporting the work with FARMIS. The authors are grateful to the Swiss National Funds 
and the Gerling Foundation for financing this study.  
References 
Berger, T. (2000), 'Agentenbasierte räumliche Simulationsmodelle in der Landwirtschaft. 
Anwendungsmöglichkeiten zur Bewertung von Diffusionsprozessen, Ressourcennutzung und 
Politikoptionen', Agrarwirtschaft, Sonderheft 168. 
Bertelsmeier, M. (2005), 'Analyse der Wirkungen unterschiedlicher Systeme von direkten 
Transferzahlungen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Bodenpacht-  und Quotenmärkten. 
Dissertation',  Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums für Verbraucherschutz,  Ernährung und 
Landwirtschaft: Reihe A: Angewandte Wissenschaft H.510, Hiltrup. 
Bichler, B., Lippert, C., Häring, A.M. and Dabbert, S. (2005), 'Die Bestimmungsgründe der räumlichen 
Verteilung des ökologischen Landbaus in Deutschland', Berichte über die Landwirtschaft, 83, 1, 
pp. 50-75. 
Buchli, S. and Flury, C. (2005), 'Policy related transaction costs of direct payments in Switzerland', 
Workshop on policy-related transaction costs, 20-21 January 2005, Paris, Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). 
CRER (2002), 'Economic evaluation of the Organic Farming Scheme: Final report to the Department of 
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs', Cambridge, Centre for Rural Economics Research, 
Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge. 
Dabbert, S., Häring, A.M. and Zanoli, R. (2004), Organic farming: policies and prospects, London, Zed 
Books. 12 
 
Elliott, J., Temple, M.L., Clinton, S., Tiffin, A.L., Rees, E. and Standen, J. (2003), 'Evidence assessment to 
inform the review of the organic farming scheme. Report to Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs', ADAS Consulting, University of Reading, Department of Agricultural and 
Food Economics. 
Haas, G., Wetterich, F. and Köpke, U. (2001), 'Comparing intensive, extensified and organic grassland 
farming in southern Germany by process life cycle assessment', Agriculture, Ecosystems and 
Environment, 83, pp. 43-53. 
Heckelei, T. (2002), 'Calibration and estimation of programming models for agricultural supply analysis - 
Habilitationsschrift', Agricultural Faculty, Bonn, University of Bonn. 
Hollenberg, K. (2001), Auswirkungen einer Umstellung der Landwirtschaft auf ökologischen Landbau, 
Kiel, Vauk. 
Howitt, R., E. (1995), 'Positive mathematical programming', Journal of Agricultural Economics, 77, 2, pp. 
329-342. 
Kuepker, B. (2004), 'Assessing the impact of decoupling on farmers' acceptance of environmental measures 
to reduce nitrogen input in cotton production: a case study for the region Thessaly, Greece', in 
Jayet, P.A. and Kleinhanss, W. (eds.), Work package 5, Deliverable D8.3. Possible options and 
impacts of decoupling within Pillar-II of CAP, Grignon, Braunschweig, GENEDEC, pp. 43-62. 
Lampkin, N.H., Schmid, O., Dabbert, S., Michelsen, J. and Zanoli, R. (2008), 'Organic action plan 
evaluation toolbox (ORGAPET). Final output of the ORGAP research project (www.orgap.org) 
for the European Commission ', Aberystwyth, Frick, Institute of Biological, Environmental and 
Rural Sciences, Aberystwyth University, UK and Research Institute of Organic Agriculture 
(FiBL), Frick, CH. 
Mann, S. (2003), 'Die Kosten der Ökomassnahmen in der Schweizer Landwirtschaft', Agrarwirtschaft und 
Agrarsoziologie, 1/03, pp. 103-130. 
Marggraf, R. (2003), 'Comparative assessment of agri-environment programmes in federal states of 
Germany', Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment, 98, pp. 507-516. 
Nemecek, T., Huguenin-Elie, O., Dubois, D. and Gaillard, G. (2005), 'Ökobilanzierung von 
Anbausystemen im Schweizerischen Acker-  und Futterbau', FAL Schriftenreihe No. 58, 
Reckenholz, Eidgenössische Forschungsanstalt für Agrarökologie und Landbau (FAL). 
OECD (2007), 'Policy design characteristics for effective targeting', in  Working Party on Agricultural 
Policies and Marktes (ed.), Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), AGR/CA/APM(2005)32/FINAL. 
Pearce, D. (2005), 'What constitutes a good agri-environmental policy evaluation?', Evaluating Agri-
Environmental Policies. Design, practice and results, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). 
Röhm, O. and Dabbert, S. (2003), 'Integrating Agri-environmental programs into regional production 
models: an extension of positive mathematical programming', Amer. J. Agr. Econ., 85, 1, pp. 254-
265. 
Sanders, J. (2007), 'Economic impact of agricultural liberalisation policies on organic farming in 
Switzerland', Institute of Rural Sciences, PhD thesis, Aberystwyth, University of Wales. 
Schader, C. (2009), 'Cost-effectiveness of organic farming for achieving environmental policy targets in 
Switzerland',  Institute of Biological, Environmental and Rural Sciences, Ph.D. thesis, 
Aberystwyth, Aberystwyth University, Wales. Research Institute of Organic Farming (FiBL), 
Frick, Switzerland. 
Schmid, E. and Sinabell, F. (2006), 'Modelling organic farming at sector level - an application to the 
reformed CAP in Austria', International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, 
August 12-18, 2006, Gold Coast, Australia, International Association of Agricultural Economists 
(IAAE). 
Swiss Federal Council (2009), 'Weiterentwicklung des Direktzahlungssystems - Bericht des Bundesrates in 
Erfüllung der Motion der Kommission für Wirtschaft und Abgaben des Ständerates vom 10. 
November 2006 (06.3635)', Bern, Schweizerischer Bundesrat. 
Tinbergen, J. (1956), Economic policy: Principles and design, Amsterdam, North Holland. 
von Alvensleben, R. (1998), 'Ökologischer Landbau aus Sicht der Umweltökonomie', Berlin, AGÖL-
Tagung, 23.1.1998. 
 
 